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RESTITUTION- 1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
The title, Restitution, is a comparatively new one. Over a period
of many years there grew up separately a number of distinct legal
and equitable remedies-quasi-contract, constructive trust, equitable
lien, reformation, rescission and others. Only recently has it been
perceived that a pervading general principle underlies all of these
remedies-the principle that "a person who has been unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other."1 Now that these several types of relief are being classed to-
gether it is more generally realized that their composite whole in-
volves a very broad field of the law. During the past year there were
ten Tennessee cases involving restitution and unjust enrichment.
I. BE1mErrs WRONGFmLY OBTAuD
1. Quasi-Contract
If I steal your automobile you may bring an action of trover against
me for its value, whether I have disposed of it or still have it. Trover
will also lie against me if I am the innocent purchaser from a thief.
Trover is a tort action compensating you for the injury which I have
done to you, but it carries overtones of restitution. If I still have the
automobile you may bring replevin and recover it. Here the auto-
mobile is restored and I have been required to make restitution to
you. If I have sold the car, replevin no longer serves the purpose and
you may resort to a third remedy and sue me in quasi-contract. This
is sometimes called "waiver of tort," but it is actually an alternative
remedy which the plaintiff may choose if he finds it more suitable for
his needs. The idea is that the defendant has been unjustly enriched
at the plaintiff's expense and should be required to make restitution.
The measure of damages may be either the value of the automobile or
the amount which the defendant received for it when he sold it.
All of this is perfectly illustrated in Creach v. Ralph Nichols Co.,
2
where the defendant, an automobile dealer which had innocently
purchased and sold a stolen car, was held liable in "waiver of tort"
for the proceeds of the sale of the car. Defendant had contended that
it should be liable, if at all, only for the profit made in the purchase
and sale of the car, since that was the extent of its net enrichment.
There is a good deal of logic in this position, but the rule has always
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
2. 267 S.W.2d 132 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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been otherwise. Perhaps this is by analogy to the rule in trover, or
perhaps it is due to the feeling that limiting a recovery to net enrich-
ment would allow a thief who stole a car and sold it for a third of its
value to be liable only for what he actually realized.
The opinion in the Creach case does not indicate why the plaintiff
sued in quasi-contract rather than tort. There are numerous reasons
why the remedy may be preferred. Sometimes, for example, this is
done because of a longer statute of limitations period,8 sometimes in
order to make use of a set-off and sometimes for other reasons.
2. Rescission
Another method by which a defendant may wrongfully obtain a
benefit is by fraud. Frequently a tort action of fraud and deceit will
lie. But here, too, there are various remedies available in restitution.
Defendant's fraud frequently produces a contract between the parties.
One of the available remedies is a bill in equity for rescission of the
contract and a restoration of the parties to the status quo. Three of
last year's cases are illustrative here.
In Dozier v. Hawthorne Development Co.,4 complainant had pur-
chased a house from defendant in the suburbs of Nashville. Finding
that the sewage disposal was inadequate because of the bad porosity
of the soil around the overflow leading from the septic tank, he sued
for a rescission on the ground of false representations. The chan-
cellor found that defendant made no representation regarding the
septic tank and drainage, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this as
correct. The chancellor granted the relief, however, on the ground of
fraudulent concealment. It appeared that the original plans for de-
veloping the subdivision in question had not been approved by the
sanitary engineer of the county because of the nature of the soil and
that new plans were drafted to provide for larger lots and make more
drainage available. Under the new plan most of the lots, including the
one in question, were approved. Nothing was said of this to the com-
plainant and he asked no questions about the sewage disposal though
he was an architect and designing engineer, with experience in devel-
oping subdivisions.
The Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor, saying: "Concealment
or nondisclosure becomes fraudulent only when there is an existing
fact or condition, as distinguished from a mere opinion, to be dis-
closed, and when there is a duty of disclosure upon the party having
knowledge of such fact or condition.... Ordinarily, no duty of dis-
3. Thus in Kirkman v. Philips, 54 Tenn. 222 (1872), relied upon in the
instant case, the court held that though an action in replevin or trover would
be barred in three years, an action of quasi-contract could be brought within
six years.
4. 262 S.w.2d 705 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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closure exists except (1) where there is a previous confidential re-
lation between the parties; (2) where it appears one or each of the
parties expressly reposes a trust or confidence in the other; or (3)
where the contract or transaction itself is intrinsically fiduciary and
calls for good faith, as in cases of insurance contracts."5
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between misrepresentation
and concealment. In Simmons v. Evans," the leading case in Ten-
nessee, defendant sold a house without revealing that water was sup-
plied only during daylight hours and not at night. Rescission was per-
mitted, the court holding that defendant was under a duty to disclose,
but adding that the statement that "there was available all the water
which they wanted" might be treated as an actual misrepresentation if
necessary. It is true that courts are slower to grant relief for failure
to disclose; no tort action will lie. The action for rescission will nor-
mally lie only where there is a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
But in the instant case rescission would probably have been granted if
defendant had failed to put in an overflow at all or if the county
sanitary engineer had refused to approve the lot in question.T
In Gibbons v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n,8 complainant
sought to set aside a release and settlement on the ground that it was
obtained by fraud. To his claim under a health and accident policy the
company had responded that it was not liable at all (because of com-
plainant's "fraud"); but it had offered him a settlement of $500, which
he accepted. Alleging that he later found that the statements were
false he sued to rescind the settlement and to establish the liability
of the company. He alleged that more than $500 was owed under the
terms of the policy and prayed that judgment be rendered against the
company, to be credited with the $500 already paid under the settle-
ment. The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the
ground that repayment or tender of the $500 was a prerequisite to the
maintenance of the suit. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
A rescission is a restoration of the status quo. A plaintiff should
clearly not be entitled to have restored to him what he had given
under the contract while he kept what he had received under it. In
an action at law-e.g., quasi-contract or replevin-it is sometimes held
that the plaintiff must have made a tender before he brings suit; but
in suits in equity it is generally held that an offer in the complaint
to repay (or perhaps even to do equity) is sufficient.9 There are a
5. Id. at 711.
6. 185 Tenn. 282, 206 S.W.2d 295 (1947).
7. The holding might well have been placed upon some ground other than
fraudulent concealment, but it seems very likely that relief would have been
granted.
8. 195 Tenn. 339, 259 S.W.2d 653 (1953).
9. The instant case is probably not inconsistent with this and would prob-
ably not require a tender prior to filing the complaint, though this is not
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number of reas ns for which a tender will be excused. One, set out in
the instant case, is when the defendant has acknowledged liability in
any event up to the amount which complainant received.10 A number
of courts hold, contrary to the instant case, that the offer is not re-
quired when all that the complainant has received is money which can
be credited if restitution is granted." This position seems less tech-
nical and somewhat more practical and realistic. If the complainant
loses, no rescission is granted; if he wins and proves that more is due
-him than the $500, it is simple to credit the decree for that amount,
while if he wins the rescission and less is due him than $500 a court
of equity has power to render a suitable decree.
In Brown v. Van Pelt1" defendant, who had previously had his
license as real estate agent revoked, led complainants to believe that
he was an authorized agent and induced them to sign a "power of
attorney" giving him authority to sell their property. He then found
a purchaser who paid him $200 as earnest money. This is a bill to res-
cmnd the deed made to the purchaser and the power of attorney. The
purchaser allowed a decree pro confesso to be entered against him,
and the chancellor held that defendant's conduct was fraudulent and
granted the rescission of both instruments. He held also that the de-
fendant was not entitled to a commission and that he must pay the
$200 paid as earnest money to the complainants.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It held that the so-
called "power of attorney" in this case did not take defendant's
services out of the statutory provision that an unlicensed real estate
broker is not authorized to do business and the judicial construction
that he is not entitled to a commission. 13 As for the $200 the court
said simply that the defendant's fraud "completely vitiated" the power
of attorney and any rights which he obtained through it and declared
that he "is not entitled to retain any benefits obtained by his fraud."
14
3. Constructive Trust
In giving the complainants the $200 earnest money in Brown v. Van
Pelt, the case just considered, the court was not restoring to them
something which they had turned over to the defendant. This was
not, strictly speaking, a part of the rescission. It was, instead, an
action to prevent the defendant from profiting-from acquiring an
unjust enrichment-from his fraudulent conduct. The remedy most
certain. It is somewhat strange that the complainant did not seek to amend
to offer to do equity after the demurrer had been sustained.
10. See Conrad v. Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 141 Tenn. 14, 206 S.W. 34
(1918), to this effect. C
11. This is the position of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §
65 (f).
12. 263 S.W.2d 956 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
13. See Winn v. Wright, 28 Tenn. App. 40, 185 S.W.2d 908 (E.S. 1944).
14. 263 S.W.2d at 958, 959.
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frequently used for this purpose is the constructive trust, and the
court in Brown was actually imposing a constructive trust on the fund
of $200.
Another case illustrating this remedy is Bell v. Gailey.15 Com-
plainant, an aged Negress, approaching senility, illiterate, ignorant of
business transactions and property values, had come under the control
of a ne'er-do-well son who was pressing her to raise money for him.
Defendant, a real estate broker also in the "loan business," had been
approached for a loan and had arranged for one secured by a mortgage
on her home. She later asked defendant to sell the home. He told her
that she could get more by selling on time, and when she insisted in
selling for cash, had her sign a contract of sale which he had already
filled out making himself the vendee. He delivered to the son a check
as down payment on the purchase price and did not pay the remainder
until he had found a buyer, arranging for the deed to be made direct
to him.
This action was brought in behalf of the complainant by her daugh-
ter as soon as she discovered the facts, to set aside the transaction as
induced by fraud. No rescission was granted, apparently because the
buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value. But the court awarded
against the defendant broker a recovery of $500, representing the
profit which he made on the transaction, allowing credit for a 5%
real estate agent's commission and certain expenses. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, declaring that on both occasions the defendant "was
consulted by the complainant in his capacity as broker and that in
that capacity he undertook to advise her about the loan and later
about the sale of the property. There was thus established a confi-
dential relationship which amounted to a trust.... She was entitled
to all of the agent's skill, knowledge and foresight, and the defendant
could not take advantage of her ignorance in this respect to make a
profit for himself by becoming the purchaser at a reduced price or
otherwise."' 6 Though the court did not use the expression, construc-
tive trust, this is clearly the remedy which was applied in the case.
II. BENEFITS CONFERRED IN PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT
Just as restitution may provide alternative remedies to actions in
tort, so may it also provide alternative remedies to actions in contract.
If I have partially performed my contract with you and you entirely
repudiate it, I can sue you for breach of contract. I may instead, how-
ever, disregard the contract and sue you in quasi-contract for the
reasonable value of the work and services or materials which you
have received. Sometimes restitution will afford the only available
remedy.
15. 260 S.W.2d 300 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
16. Id. at 303.
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Sadler v. Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corp.17 is an
example, Plaintiff brought an action to recover an amount due on a
contract for constructing a rural electric distribution project. The
jury found that plaintiff did not complete its contract with defendant
and the court rendered a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action.
When this was- affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff filed a
motion to rehear, contending that it was "entitled to recover for the
value of the part performance of the contract by it, even though it
breached its contract by failing to fully perform the contract." The
court agreed that an action in quantum meruit might lie for the value
of the benefits conferred but held that the "plaintiff had failed to
show the value of the work which it actually did." There was proof
that "the work actually done was, also, defectively done to defendant's
damage." Since defendant was not allowed to show the defective con-
dition of the work and the damage which it sustained, there was no
way to determine the "value of the work which the plaintiff did in
its defective condition.'
Here there could be no recovery on the contract and the basis of
the action would have to be in restitution for the benefits conferred.
It is the rule in a majority of the states, subject to some exceptions,
that a party who has breached a contract cannot recover even in
quasi-contract, the position being taken that the court should not aid
him in any way. But a number of courts do allow recovery; and the
position of the court in the instant case that he can recover for the net
enrichment, less the damages incurred by defendant for breach of
contract, seems eminently sound. The court is also wise in placing
the burden on the plaintiff to establish the value of the net enrichment.
Robinson v. Durabilt Mfg. Co.1"' presents a very interesting situation.
Defendant manufactured and sold at wholesale throughout the country
a machine called a crop drier. It entered into an oral contract with
plaintiff giving him exclusive agency for a number of southern states,
including Mississippi. Plaintiff was to pay defendant $700 for each
machine and to set the retail price himself, keeping all the profit; he
was to pay all expenses and to decide what expenses should be in-
curred. After two years in which plaintiff sold several machines and
expended several thousand dollars in adventising, the defendant, over
plaintiff's protest, granted another person the agency for the machine
in Mississippi. This was an action in quantum meruit for expenses in-
curred in advertising and promoting sales in the southern states. The
lower court sustained a demurrer to the declaration "on the ground
that the contract was indefinite, unenforceable, without mutuality or
consideration."
17. 36 Tenn. App. 495, 259 S.W.2d 544 (M.S. 1952).
18. Id. at 500, 259 S.W.2d at 547.
19. 195 Tenn. 452, 260 S.W.2d 174 (1953).
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The Supreme Court affirmed. Ii declared that under the common
law rule a plaintiff cannot recover in quantum meruit more than the
compensation set out in the contract, and plaintiff had received that
compensation (his profit in the sale of the machines). It added that
this "rule has been so far modified that where anything has been done
from which the other party has received a substantial benefit, and
which he has appropriated, a recovery may be had based upon such
benefit. The basis of this recovery is not the original contract, but a
new implied agreement deducible from the new delivery and accep-
tance of some valuable service or thing."20 While the court construed
the plaintiff's declaration as seeking to come within this principle it
held the principle inapplicable to the facts since the defendant had
no way in which it could refuse to accept the benefit of the advertising
after it had given the second agency: "Where the nature of the benefit
received by the employer is such that it cannot be abandoned by him
upon his termination of a contract which he has a right to terminate,
then he will not be required to pay for the receipt of such benefit."21
If there had been a definite contract in writing for a specific number
of years, plaintiff might have sued for breach of contract and recovered
for his advertising expenses as a part of the damages. If the' adver-
tising had been incurred at the direction of the defendant, the court
would probably have found that this was a benefit which had been
accepted and for which he must pay. The difficulty is that the benefit
is incidental and indirect, that it was voluntarily incurred by the
plaintiff for his own purposes and not asked for or deliberately re-
ceived by the defendant. Yet there was both a benefit to defendant
and a loss to plaintiff. The decision is a difficult one and must have
occasioned much discussion in the judges' conference.
Recovery might possibly have been granted on an entirely different
basis-that of protecting the "reliance interest" of the plaintiff. Thus
in Minsky's Follies of Florida, Inc. v. Sennes,/2 the parties orally agreed
for lease of a nightclub. The lessor, at lessee's request, obtained a
liquor license, hired a watchman, paid counsel fees for preparing the
lease and incurred other expenses. The lessee then repudiated the
contract. Since the contract was within the statute of frauds and
unenforceable, plaintiff was not allowed to recover rent but he did
recover for the enumerated expenses. The similarity to the instant
case is apparent.
23
20. Id. at 175, quoting from Filden v Besley, 42 Mich. 100, 3 N.W. 278, 279, 36
Am. Rep. 433, 434 (1879).
21. Id. at 175.
22. 206 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1953), 52 MICH. L. REv. 761 (1954).
23. For other cases and a careful analysis of the "reliance interest" see




IH. BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER LEGAL COMPULSION
Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors
The Restatement of Restitution provides that "a person who has
discharged more than his proportionate share of a duty owed by him-
self and another as to which, between the two, neither had a prior
duty of performance, is entitled to contribution from the other. , ,24
Thus one of two sureties who pays the whole of an obligation may
obtain contribution from the other. The same principle is obviously
applicable to joint tortfeasors. But, deriving from the early, misunder-
stood case of Merryweather v. Nixon,2 5 the general rule at common
law came to be that restitution was not available to the plaintiff be-
cause of the wrongful nature of his conduct as a tortfeasor. The rule
has been sharply criticized by numerous authorities and its obvious
injustice caused many states to pass statutes changing the rule.20 A
few states followed a minority view and held that there might be
contribution at common law between joint tortfeasors who were
merely negligent. Tennessee is one of these states, reaching this forth-
right and commendable result in the case of Davis v. Broad Street
Garage.
27
Twice in the past year the Supreme Court had occasion to consider
a suit for contribution between tortfeasors. American Casualty Co. v.
Billingsley" raised no problems. It was held that contribution should
be granted in a short opinion quoting at some length from the Davis
case.
The second case, Vaughn v. Gill,-' raises a number of problems. It
is a very confusing case and its meaning and significance are not clear.
Complainants Vaughn were father and son, owner and driver, respec-
tively, of an automobile which collided with a car owned and operated
by defendant Gill. Rose Finkelstein was a passenger in defendant's
automobile. She and Gill filed suits against the two Vaughns. Gill
lost his suit because of contributory negligence and Miss Finkelstein
recovered a judgment for $2,000, which the insurance company paid.
This is a bill by the Vaughns brought against Gill for contribution of
half the judgment paid by the insurance company.
The Supreme Court held that a demurrer was properly sustained.
The bill on its face showed that the insurance company was subrogated
to the rights of the Vaughns and there was no indication that it was
participating in the suit or that the suit was for its benefit. In addition
24. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 81 (1937).
25. 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799)
26. Allbright Bros. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953) is a case
coming from the federal district court for Western Tennessee. It involves
application of the Arkansas point tortfeasors statute.
27. 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 357 (1950), approved in 4 VAND. L. REv. 907.
28. 195 Tenn. 448, 260 S.W.2d 173 (1953).
29. 264 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1953).
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the plaintiffs, having themselves not lost anything, but having been
wholly indemnified by the insurance company, had no basis for com-
plaint. Either of these grounds, the court indicated, was sufficient to
sustain the demurrer, and nothing further need have been said.
The Court proceeded, however, to declare that contribution was not
available anyhow because it was not shown that defendant and the
complainants were "under a common burden or liability." The mean-
ing which the opinion imputes to this requirement is ambiguous. Two
interpretations seem possible. There is some language which would
appear to suggest that the parties are not to be regarded as "under
a common burden or liability" until a judgment has been obtained by
the injured party against both of them.30 If this is the basis for the
holding the doctrine of the Davis case has been completely emascu-
lated. It is true that a judgment had been obtained against both tort-
feasors in that case but no significance was attached by the court to
this circumstance. In addition, there was no such judgment against
the defendant in the American Casualty case, decided by the same
court just five months prior to Vaughn, and it hardly seems likely that
that case would so quickly be overruled sub silentio. If a judgment
against both tortfeasors by the injured party is required this means
that this party has complete control as to how the loss will eventually
be distributed between the tortfeasors. It is enough to assure his
own compensation from either tortfeasor and no legitimate or socially
desirable interest will be advanced by allowing him control over
the legal rights between the tortfeasors themselves.
The second possible interpretation of the opinion arises from the
circumstance, incidentally referred to, that Miss Finkelstein's cause
of action against Gill had at that time been barred by the statute of
limitations and was no longer existent. 1 For this reason, the opinion
seems to be saying, the parties are no longer "under a common burden
or liability." This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the
court relies on a Wisconsin opinion in which contribution was not
allowed because of a family immunity between the injured party and
the defendant tortfeasor so that there was no "common liability"
30. "The test is not whether acting together, both tortfeasors were equally
negligent and responsible for the tort, but whether both being under a common
burden of liability, one of them had been made to pay more than his equitable
share of such liability. A judgment was rendered in favor of Miss Finkelstein
against Vaughn, but there never was rendered any judgment of liability in
favor of Miss Finkelstein against Gill, therefore there never was any common
burden of liability to invoke the equitable doctrine of contribution." Id. at 810.
31. "Obviously in the present case, it cannot be said that the complainants
and Gill are under a common burden or liability, when it definitely appears
from the fact of the bill that the complainants were judgment debtors to Miss
Finkelstein; and that Gill was never such debtor, and that the statute of
limitations has run against any claim that Miss Finkelstein might have against
Gill as a result of the collision of automobiles." Id. at 808.
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between the latter and the plaintiff ItortfeasorP2
This second interpretation is less destructive of the previous state
of the law, but even it seems questionable. When the plaintiff tort-
feasor pays the judgment against him, he should immediately have
a right of action for contribution against the defendant tortfeasor.
This is a new, independent right of action; it should have its own
statute of limitations running from the time it comes into existence
and it should not be barred by the running of the one-year statute on
the original tort claim.3s A contrary holding here, too, would give the
injured party an unhealthy control of eventual liability between the
joint tortfeasors since he could secretly agree with the one who would
undertake to testify for him that he would bring his suit against the
other just prior to the time the statute had run.
All that the opinion has to say on contribution in the Vaughn case
is essentially dictum, since the court had already sustained the de-
murrer on two other grounds, and it may well be hoped that the court
will not feel bound by this confusing dictum in the future.
Two federal cases involve application of statutes giving rise to rights
in the nature of restitution. Allbright Bros. v. Hull-Dobbs Co.34 in-
volves an Arkansas statute providing for contribution between joint
tortfeasors. Hutto v. Benson" involves the statutory right of an em-
ployer (or its insurance carrier) which has paid a workmen's com-
pensation claim, to recover from a third party who had negligently
injured the employee. The restitutionary remedies of indemnity and
of subrogation are analogous and have been held applicable 'to these
facts without the need of a statute. Both cases involved statutes from
other states, and they are discussed more in detail in the article on
Conflict of Laws.
32. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721, 92
A.L.R. 680 (1934).
33. This is the holding of the great majority of cases. For discussion and
collection of the cases, see Note, 22 A.L.R.2d 925 (1951).
34. 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).
35. 110 F. Supp. 355 (E-D. Tenn. 1953), rev'd, 212 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1954).
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